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Monuments and the Politics of Memory: 
Commemorating Kurt Eisner and the 
Bavarian Revolutions of 1918-1919 
in Postwar Munich 
Gavriel D. Rosenfeld 
GIVEN 
the turbulent nature of recent German history, studies of 
postwar German memory understandably have focused upon the 
issue of Vergangenheitsbewaltigung?the difficult process of "coming 
to terms" with the historical experience of the Third Reich and the Sec? 
ond World War. This topic's magnitude has rightly inspired considerable 
scholarly attention but, at the same time, it has also had the unintended 
effect of overshadowing other German struggles with memory.1 In recent 
years, however, this state of affairs has begun to change. As the epochal 
events of 1989-90 have forced Germans to confront still another burden- 
some historical legacy?that of communism?the increasing calls for a 
"second" Vergangenheitsbewaltigung have, for better or worse, broken the 
monopolistic hold of the Third Reich on the nation's historical con? 
sciousness.2 Historians have already begun to speculate about the likely 
1. Indeed, as some observers have pointed out, this is implicit in the very composition 
of the term Vergangenheitsbewaltigung itself. Its meaning, roughly "coming to terms with the 
past," has reduced an expansive term?the past-?to but twelve years of German history. 
See Bernd Hey, "Die NS-Prozesse?Versuch einer juristischen Vergangenheitsbewaltigung," 
Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 6 (1981): 331. Most recent studies have been con? 
servative critiques of the concept. See Manfred Kittel, Die Legende von der zweiten Schuld: 
Vergangenheitsbewaltigung in der Ara Adenauer (Berlin, 1993); Michael Wolffsohn, Keine Angst 
vor Deutschland! (Erlangen, 1990), 96-110; Eckhard Jesse, "'Vergangenheitsbewaltigung' in 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," Der Staat 26, no. 4 (1987): 539-65. See also, Peter Graf 
Kielmansegg, Lange Schatten: Vom Umgang der Deutschen mit der nationabozialistischen Vergangenheit 
(Berlin, 1989) and Ulrich Brochhagen, Nach Niirnberg: Vergangenheitsbewaltigung und Westintegration 
in der Ara Adenauer (Hamburg, 1994). 
2. Conservatives have taken up the call for the second Vergangenheitsbewaltigung. See 
Karlheinz Weissmann, Riickruf in die Geschichte (Berlin, 1992). Christa Hoffmann, Stunden 
Null? Vergangenheitsbewaltigung in Deutschland, 1945 und 1989 (Bonn, 1992). Martin Jay's 
"Once More an Inability to Mourn? Reflections on the Left Melancholy of Our Time," 
German Politics and Society 27 (Fall 1992), offers a view from a different perspective. 
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course of this new Vergangenheitsbewaltigung by comparing it to the experience 
of coming to terms with the legacy of Nazism.3 Although this compara? 
tive perspective promises to better our understanding of both dictatorial 
eras, other historical comparisons may be equally useful. By examining 
the Germans' attempts to "work through" earlier periods of their nation's 
burdened history, a broader understanding of German collective memory 
and its possible future development may be gained. 
One area of considerable interest is the highly politicized collective 
memory of Germany's abortive revolutions of 1918-1919. This brief pe? 
riod constitutes one of the most turbulent eras in recent German history. 
Beginning with the collapse of the monarchy and the revolutionary proc- 
lamation of a republican form of government, what initially appeared to 
be a peaceful transition of power soon degenerated into bloodshed with 
the ensuing outbreak and violent suppression of radical left-wing attempts 
at revolution. In view of the dramatic nature of these events, it is no 
surprise that they occupy an important place in the collective memory of 
many Germans. The difficulties that succeeding generations have had in 
dealing with the memory of this era, in turn, attest to its historical im? 
portance and contemporary relevance. Indeed, the memory of this revo? 
lutionary era may well even have implications for the future development 
of the second Vergangenheitsbewaltigung in a newly reunified Germany. Al? 
though the "working through" of the left-wing, revolutionary history of 
the German Democratic Republic is a topic that will be examined in full 
only by the next generation of historians, hints as to its possible course 
may emerge by analyzing the manner in which earlier episodes in the 
German revolutionary tradition have evolved in collective memory. 
An excellent demonstration of the controversial place of the revolutions 
of 1918-1919 in German collective memory can be found in the city of 
Munich. As one of the main hotbeds (apart from Berlin) of revolutionary 
ferment after 1918, Munich was the site of traumatic events whose place 
in local memory has long been divisive. Already in the reactionary early 
years of the Weimar Republic, the era of revolution had become sur- 
rounded by legend and "distorted . . . until it was no longer recogniz- 
able."4 In the decades that have followed, both the revolutions of 1918-1919 
and the figure most closely associated with them, Kurt Eisner, have con- 
3. Bernd Faulenbach, Markus Meckel, Hermann Weber, eds., Die Partei hatte immer Recht? 
Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur (Essen, 1994); Gotthard Jasper, 
"Vergangenheitsbewaltigung': Historische Erfahrungen und politische Voraussetzungen," in 
Clemens Burrichter and Giinter Schodl, Ohne Erinnerung keine Zukunft! Zur Aufarbeitung 
von Vergangenheit in einigen europaischen Gesellschaften unserer Tage (Cologne, 1992), 17-31; 
Jurgen Habermas, "Die Last der doppelten Vergangenheit," Die Zeit, 13 May 1994, p. 54. 
4. Eberhard Kolb, "Foreword," in Revolution und Rdterepublik in Munchen, 1918/19 in 
Augenzeugenberichte, ed., Gerhard Schmolze (Munich, 1978), 9-10. 
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tinued to spark dissension. So much so that the controversy surrounding 
the recent marking of the events' 75th anniversary prompted hyperbolic 
comparisons to a Bavarian "historians' debate."5 The revolutionary era of 
1918-1919 has remained a politically sensitive issue not merely in the city 
of Munich but also within the entire state of Bavaria, whose current, 
jealously-held republican identity as a Freistaat can be traced back to the 
period in question. The unsettled relationship toward the revolutions of 
1918-1919 in Munich and throughout Bavaria thus reflects the existence 
of insecurities in both local and regional identity. Examining how this 
period of history has evolved in the collective memory of the citizens of 
postwar Munich, in turn, can shed light on the present as well as the past. 
One of the most useful ways of analyzing the local memory of the 
revolutionary era involves examining the city's monuments that commemorate 
it. Recent scholarship on collective memory has confirmed the value of 
studying monuments. Ever since the pioneering French scholar of collec? 
tive memory, Maurice Halbwachs, pointed out a half century ago that 
"collective memory unfolds within a spatial framework," scholars have 
begun to analyze systematically how memory is infused into urban space, 
particularly in the form of monuments.6 Spanning a wide array of ob? 
jects?from stones and statues to plaques and street signs?monuments 
are paradoxical structures. Though erected for eternity with the intent of 
fixing the past permanently in physical form, they suffer from built-in 
obsolescence. For while monuments ostensibly are erected to commemo? 
rate some feature of the past, they actually offer a clearer image of the 
present's view of it. And inasmuch as this view inevitably evolves over 
time, the status of most existing monuments is subject to reappraisal?as 
manifested by their demolition, alteration, or replacement. By examining 
the variety of responses toward monuments over time, therefore, the evolving 
nature of memory reveals itself.7 
5. Christian Schneider, "Historikerstreit auf bayerisch," Suddeutsche Zeitung (SZ). 6/7 
November 1993, p. 3. 
6. Halbwachs further notes, "we can understand how we recapture the past only by 
understanding how it is ... preserved in our physical surroundings." Maurice Halbwachs, 
The Collective Memory (New York, 1980), 140. Since Pierre Nora's work on the subject, 
other scholars have focused on the relationship between monuments, memory, and iden? 
tity. See, among many others, Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: Les lieux de 
memoire," Representations (Spring, 1989): 7-25; John Gillis, ed., Commemorations: The Poli? 
tics of National Identity (Princeton, 1994); James Young, The Texture of Memory: Holocaust 
Memoriab and Meaning (New Haven, 1993); Yael Zerubavel, Recovered Roots: Collective Memory 
and the Making of Israeti National Tradition (Chicago, 1995); Thomas Nipperdey, "Nationalidee 
und Nationaldenkmal in Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert," Historische Zeitschrift 3 (1968): 
529-85. 
7. Halbwachs's assertion that memory is fundamentally rooted and preserved in social 
relationships?indeed, that it is condemned to oblivion without them?raises questions as 
to its dissemination over time. The apparent difficulty in accounting for the passing on of 
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The shifting memory of the revolutionary era of 1918-1919 in postwar 
Munich is best analyzed by studying the wide range of responses toward 
the monuments commemorating it. The erection of new monuments as 
well as the demolition, restoration, or relocation of old ones reveal nu? 
merous insights into the dynamics of memory. With respect to these various 
types of responses, an analytical strategy combining a formal and "bio- 
graphical" analysis offers the most comprehensive manner of understand? 
ing the role of monuments in the formation of memory.8 This approach 
focuses upon the object and the manner of commemoration as well as its 
origins and reception. The degree of selectivity displayed in choosing 
what is to be commemorated and what is to be omitted constitutes the 
first issue of consideration. Understanding how the past is commemorated 
requires studying the monument's formal qualities; whether it is abstract 
or figurative, whether or not it possesses a textual inscription, as well as 
the wording of that inscription, its size and location (both affecting its 
public visibility) bears heavily on a monument's ability to convey an in? 
tended message. Moreover, the question of agency and intent?who erected 
a monument and why?provides insights into the monument's signifi? 
cance. Finally, its popular reception?especially the presence of debate or 
controversy surrounding a monument's erection?yields perhaps the clearest 
insights into collective memory. 
Before examining the various responses to monuments pertaining to 
the revolutions of 1918-1919 in postwar Munich, however, it is neces? 
sary to discuss briefly the history of the period itself. Since the memories 
of this important period have frequently diverged from the historical record, 
discussing the era's central events provides some standard by which to 
evaluate their evolution in memory. Since this undertaking is necessarily 
dependent upon the interpretations of historians who are themselves em- 
bedded in their own and their era's particular concerns, reconstructing 
the events of the past requires maintaining a critical eye toward underly- 
ing historiographical agendas.9 Nevertheless, for all of the recent insights 
memory once its original bearers, those who personally experienced events, have them? 
selves passed on, however, is addressed by pointing to the existence of "communities of 
memory," groups who empathetically identify with, and assign meaning to, events of the 
past through various commemorative ceremonies and gestures. Iwona Irwin-Zarecka, Frames 
of Remembrance: The Dynamics of Collective Memory (New Brunswick, 1994), 47-49; Paul 
Connerton, How Societies Remember (Cambridge, 1989), 37-40. 
8. James Young refers to a "biographical" approach to monuments, Young, The Texture 
of Memory, ix. 
9. The Bavarian revolutions sparked the most historical studies during the 1960s and 
1970s and have tailed off as of late. The subject acquired the most interest among East 
German historians who, like Hans Beyer, aimed to demonstrate the existence of mass 
working-class support for the second Rdterepublik, Hans Beyer, Von der November Revolution 
zur Rdterepublik in Miinchen (Berlin, 1957). An opposing view can be found in Allan MitchelTs, 
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into the blurred boundaries between history and memory, the two ulti? 
mately emerge as distinct.10 
Although historians have focused more on the course of revolutionary 
events in Berlin, the history of the revolutionary era in Bavaria is argu- 
ably more intriguing. In many ways, early twentieth-century Bavaria was 
an unlikely setting for political revolution. Ruled by the longest uninter- 
rupted monarchy in Europe, the Wittelsbachs, and dominated by the Catholic 
Church, Bavaria was a seemingly stable political entity firmly in the hands 
of conservative forces. However, as Allan Mitchell has concisely put it, 
after World War I, "Bavaria was the first of the German states to become 
a republic and the last to be released from the grip of radicalism."11 In? 
deed, for almost exactly six months, from 7 November 1918 to the first 
days of May 1919, Bavaria experienced unprecedented political instabil- 
ity, from the fall of the monarchy to the appearance of four different left? 
wing governments, to the brief but bloody outbreak of civil war brought 
about by the intervention of "white" counterrevolutionary military forces. 
Many complex factors contributed to this revolutionary turn in Bavar? 
ian history. The resistance of the monarchy to adopt overdue political 
reforms, the war-induced worsening of economic conditions, the exist? 
ence of a growing and disaffected working class, and the resulting in? 
crease of support for the SPD, as well as the general war weariness all 
helped to create an atmosphere of acute political discontent in Munich.12 
Revolution in Bavaria, 1918-1919: The Eisner Regime and the Soviet Republic (Princeton, 1965) 
which, though clearly oriented toward debunking east bloc historiography, is the best work 
in the fairly scant English-language literature on the subject. See also Richard Grunberger, 
Red Rising in Bavaria (London, 1973). Recent attention toward Kurt Eisner's role in the 
period has been particularly promoted by the work of his granddaughter, the journalist Freya 
Eisner, who has been motivated by the desire to overturn left-wing and right-wing stereotypes 
about Eisner's political career. See, most recently, Freya Eisner, "Kurt Eisners Ort in der 
sozialistischen Bewegung," Vierteljahreshefte fiir Zeitgeschichte (July, 1995): 407-37. See also 
Rudolf Herz and Dirk Halfbrodt, Revolution und Fotografie, Munchen 1918/19 (Berlin, 1988). 
10. For other works on history and memory, see Patrick Hutton, History as an Art of 
Memory (Hanover, NH, 1993); Richard Terdiman, Present Past: Modernity and the Memory 
Crisis (Ithaca, 1993; Jacques Le Goff, History and Memory (New York, 1992). See also the 
journal, History and Memory: Studies in Representation of the Past. For the purposes of this 
brief essay, the following simplified distinctions between history and memory can be of? 
fered: history is the reconstruction of the past in written form by historians; memory 
represents how the past (as well as how written history) is perceived by society. Whereas 
the past is forever fixed, both history and memory evolve over time, with neither attaining 
an absolute or objectively "true" understanding of the past. This is not to say that history 
and memory are equally subjective, for their standards of reconstructing the past are very 
different. Still, although history has traditionally aimed (at least until recently) for a high 
degree of scientific objectivity, the opposition made by Halbwachs and others between a 
scientific history and "subjective" view of the past represented by memory can no longer 
be accepted. 
11. Mitchell, Revolution in Bavaria, 5. 
12. Ibid., 11-20. The creation of new war-related industries in the city after 1914 (especially 
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It was the pivotal role of Kurt Eisner, the head of the Munich USPD 
(Independent Socialists), in guiding this discontent in a revolutionary di? 
rection that proved decisive. Eisner, a resident of Munich since 1910, had 
opposed the war from the beginning and had gradually won support for 
his revolutionary aims. On 7 November 1918, the extent of local support 
for Eisner became clear at the enormous peace demonstration organized 
by the socialist parties and trade unions at Munich's Theresienwiese; after 
delivering a speech criticizing the Bavarian government in front of some 
50,000 people, Eisner led a sizable band of soldiers, workers, and other 
radicals in a march through the city that culminated in the forced occu? 
pation of the Bavarian Landtag.13 There, before a large crowd, Eisner 
declared the monarchy deposed and proclaimed the creation of the "Freistaat 
Bayern," the new Bavarian republic.14 With King Ludwig III and his 
family gone and billowing red flags draped from the city's main cathedral, 
the Frauenkirche, the revolution appeared to have been a success. 
The success of the revolution, however, was short-lived. Several months 
after having acquired the position of prime minister, Eisner ran into po? 
litical difficulties with his SPD coalition partners over their opposition to 
the future participation in the governance of the state of the revolution? 
ary workers and soldiers' councils, or Rate. Forced to bow to the de? 
mands of the moderate SPD, however, Eisner lost the support of the 
more radical anarchists and communists. This fragmentation of the Left 
contributed to the USPD's poor showing in the elections of 12 January 
1919 which, in addition to worsening economic problems and growing 
right-wing agitation by extremist groups such as the Thule-Gesellschaft, 
led Eisner to decide to tender his resignation in the hope of restoring 
political order.15 
The restoration of political stability, however, was doomed by the as- 
the Krupp works in the northern districts) dramatically increased the size of Munich's 
working class, a development that lent new support to the SPD and its constitutional 
reform efforts. Ibid., 20-29. 
13. Ibid., 89-101; Schmolze, Revolution und Raterepublik, 85-110. 
14. The oft-cited line read by Eisner was: "Fortan ist Bayern ein Freistaat" (From this 
moment on, Bavaria is a republic). As will be seen, the use of the term Freistaat would be 
highly controversial in postwar Munich. Rathaus Munchen/Direktorium, Stenographischer 
Sitzungsdienst (RMDSS)/RP, Bauausschuss, 2 February 1989, 27-34. 
15. Compared to the SPD's 33 percent of the vote, the USPD received only 2.5 per? 
cent. The fact that the BVP, the postwar incarnation of the Catholic Center Party, re? 
ceived the highest electoral total of 35 percent indicates the general degree of conservatism 
in Bavaria. Mitchell, Revolution in Bavaria, 217-18. The Thule-Gesellschaft was the most 
active in organizing propagandistic smear campaigns against the Eisner regime as well as 
more drastic actions ranging from espionage and kidnapping to paramilitary insurrection. 
Hermann Wilhelm, Dichter, Denker, Fememorder: Rechtsradikalismus und Antisemitismus in Miinchen 
von der Jahrhundertwende bis 1921 (Berlin, 1989), 57-76. 
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sassination of Kurt Eisner on 20 February 1919 by a twenty-two year old 
ex-lieutenant, Count Anton von Arco auf Valley, in front of the Palais 
Montgelas on the Promenadestrasse in Munich's Altstadt. This single act 
of political violence, committed by a man of strong right-wing and anti- 
Semitic convictions, radically transformed the Bavarian political scene.16 
Following further assassination attempts against Bavarian Landtag mem? 
bers the same day, a new radical government, or Zentralrat, dominated by 
the left-wing parties and Rate, seized power under the leadership of Ernst 
Niekisch and declared martial law.17 By early April, however, the inability 
of the new government to restore order led to the occurrence of two 
additional revolutions. On April 7, a group of idealistic anarchists, including 
Niekisch, Ernst Toller, Gustav Landauer, and Erich Muhsam, proclaimed 
the creation of a Bavarian Soviet Republic (Rdterepublik) in the hope of 
spreading "world revolution." This government lasted less than a week, 
however, at which time the communists, led by Eugen Levine and Max 
Levien, replaced what they dismissed as the "pseudo-Soviet Republic," 
(Scheinrdterepublik) with a second, genuine Soviet Republic.18 
The violent suppression of the second Rdterepublik by "white" military 
forces in early May 1919 brought to a bloody end the six-month period 
of revolutionary activity in Munich. As in Berlin, where the SPD-led 
republican government cooperated with the conservative military in crushing 
the Spartacist uprising in January 1919, the Munich SPD leader, Johannes 
Hoffmann, together with hardline SPD Reichswehrminister Gustav Noske, 
ordered the retaking of the city by a coalition of government troops and 
right-wing Freikorps units, commanded by the Prussian general Ernst von 
Oven. Having already engaged in atrocities on the outskirts of the city, 
the invading 35,000 man army launched into a vengeful campaign of 
murder upon hearing news of the retaliatory execution of ten hostages 
(including eight members of the Thule-Gesellschaft and two Freikorps 
soldiers) by "red" troops at the Luitpoldgymnasium south of the Altstadt. 
In the following days, "white" troops indiscriminately killed over 600 
people in the city, particularly in left-leaning, working-class neighborhoods 
such as Giesing.19 Among the most prominent victims were Gustav Landauer, 
16. It has often been speculated that Arco-Valley killed Eisner for complex psychological 
reasons due to his own anti-Semitic self-hatred. Born of a Jewish mother (from the Co? 
logne Oppenheimer banking family), Arco-Valley had been rejected for membership in the 
Thule-Gesellschaft because of his "impure" background?a fact that, according to many, 
led him to assassinate Eisner as proof of his racial trustworthiness. Wilhelm, Dichter, Denker, 
Fememorder, 62; Schmolze, Revoltion und Raterepublik, 227-29. 
17. Albert Schwarz, "Die Zeit von 1918 bis 1933," in Handbuch der Bayerischen Geschichte, 
ed. Max Spindler, vol. 4 (Munich, 1974), 428. 
18. Mitchell, Revolution in Bavaria, 303-19; Grunberger, Red Rising, 111-14. 
19. The total death figures vary. Hans-Gunther Richardi has claimed that between 30 
April and 8 May 1919, some 557 people were killed. "Die kurze Herrschaft der Rate in 
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who was beaten to death and "Red Army" chief, Rudolf Egelhofer, who 
was fatally shot. Following subsequent trials, Eugen Levine was executed 
for treason while the other revolutionary leaders received jail sentences of 
varying lengths. 
Although the Bavarian Soviet Republic's existence was brief, its long- 
term effects were considerable. Immediately following the crushing of the 
Left, Bavaria became a bastion of right-wing political radicalism. In March 
1920, a Reichswehr-\ed putsch brought to power Gustav von Kahr, who 
subsequently turned Bavaria into a so-called Ordnungszelle?a haven for 
all the existing right-wing, militaristic, monarchistic, and antirepublican 
forces in Germany.20 This reactionary atmosphere, more importandy, provided 
fertile ground for the emergence of the Nazi Party, many of whose future 
members had actively opposed the Eisner regime.21 Up until, and even 
following, Hitler's failed putsch at the Feldherrnhalle on 9 November 
1923, the NSDAP gained considerable political support in the city.22 And 
although support for the Nazis subsequently declined in Munich, the party's 
early success earned the city the loyalty of Hitler and the official title, 
"Capital of the Movement," "Hauptstadt der Bewegung," in 1935. In short, 
Munich's chaotic experience of left-wing revolution promoted the ascendancy 
of the radical Right and helped make the city the birthplace of the most 
fateful political movement in modern German history.23 
Miinchen," SZ, 7 April 1994, p. 35. Others cite figures of over 700, if not 1000. Hans 
Nohbauer, Miinchen: Eine Geschichte der Stadt und ihrer Burger vol. 2. Von 1854 bis zur 
Gegenwart (Munich, 1992), 206; Schwarz, "Die Zeit," 432. 
20. Wilfried Rudloff, "Auf dem Weg zum 'Hilter-Putsch': Gegenrevolutionares Milieu 
und friiher Nationalsozialismus in Miinchen," in Stadtmuseum Miinchen, Miinchen? "Hauptstadt 
der Bewegung" (Munich, 1993), 36. 
21. Among the future Nazis who opposed the Eisner regime and attempted to unseat 
the Rdterepublik were former members of the Thule-Gesellschaft such as Dietrich Eckart, 
Hans Frank, Rudolf Hess, and Alfred Rosenberg, and Freikorps members, such as Franz 
Ritter von Epp and Ernst Rohm. 
22. In national Reichstag elections, Munich support for the NSDAP began higher than 
the national total but later sank below it. Thus, in May 1924, 28.5 percent of all Miinchner 
voted for the Volkischer Block (the successor party to the temporarily banned NSDAP), 
while only 6.5 percent of all Germans voted for it nationally; in May, 1928, the Nazis 
gained 2.6 percent of the total national vote, but 10.7 percent of the Munich vote; in 
September the figures were 18.3 percent nationally and 21.8 percent in the city; by July 
1932, however, the figures were 37.3 percent nationally and 28.9 percent locally, and by 
November 1932, the figures were 33.1 percent and 24.9 percent respectively. See Clemens 
Vollnhals, "Der Aufstieg der NSDAP in Miinchen, 1925 bis 1933: Forderer und Gegner," 
in: Miinchen?"Hauptstadt der Bewegung," 157-65; Richard Hamilton, Who Voted for Hitler? 
(Princeton, 1982), 144-55, 476; Klaus Schumann, "Kommunalpolitik in Miinchen zwischen 
1918 und 1933," in Christoph Stolzl, Die Zwanziger Jahre in Miinchen (Munich, 1979), 1-17. 
23. See the catalogue for the eponymous 1993-94 exhibition at the Munich city mu? 
seum, Miinchen?"Hauptstadt der Bewegung," (Munich, 1993) for the most comprehensive 
view of the relationship between the city and the movement. See also Bjorn Mensing and 
Friedrich Prinz, Irrlicht im leuchtenden Miinchen"? Der Nationalsozialismus in der "Hauptstadt der 
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The political upheaval caused by the revolutions of 1918-1919, in turn, 
has had the unavoidable effect of politicizing their place in collective 
memory. From the beginning of the Weimar Republic to the present 
postwar period, opposing memories of Kurt Eisner and the Bavarian revo? 
lutions of 1918-1919 have competed fiercely with one another in Munich. 
During the Weimar period, both the Left and the Right commemorated 
the turbulent revolutionary era in highly partisan fashion, with each claiming 
their respective martyrs. After 1933, however, the Nazis attempted forc- 
ibly to erase the prior competition of memories and impose an official 
mnemonic consensus. This was the period in which distortions of the 
historical record, extant since the Weimar era, were firmly canonized and 
the myth of Kurt Eisner as the demonic architect of revolutionary violence 
and civic chaos was enthroned as the standard view of the past. In con? 
trast to this rather predictable development of memory in the Third Reich, 
the postwar era has witnessed the return of the politicized contestation of 
memory as well as its dynamic expansion. Since 1945, the liberal and 
conservative views of Kurt Eisner and the revolutions of 1918-1919 formed 
in the Weimar era have once more competed against one another. A new 
feature of these views of the past is their refraction through the recent 
experience of the Third Reich. To a degree, the distorted Nazi myths of 
Eisner and the revolutions of 1918-1919 were retained by the postwar 
society, especially among conservative citizens. Left-wing Miinchner, 
meanwhile, frequently linked the revolutionary era to the Third Reich in 
a didactic manner, using the events of 1918-1919 to impart lessons about 
the dangers of fascism. Despite the incessant competition of these oppos? 
ing views, however, the years since 1945 generally have witnessed the 
yielding of the conservative perspective to the more liberal one. In the 
process, a view dominated by historical myths has yielded considerably to 
one which more closely resembles the historical record. This, of course, 
is not to deny the partisan nature and selective vision of both perspec? 
tives; neither, however, is it to equate their subjectivity. Whereas the 
conservative view generally has attempted to deemphasize the place of 
Kurt Eisner and the revolutions of 1918-1919 in local memory, the lib? 
eral view has attempted to increase it. The influence of this latter position, 
in turn, is confirmed by the increasingly explicit pattern of commemorating 
the revolutionary past in local monuments. Nevertheless, despite this apparent 
"progress" in coming to terms with a difficult past, the continuing exist- 
ence of dissension surrounding its legacy reveals that the proverbial 
" 
Schlufistrich" has by no means been drawn. 
During the Weimar Republic, left-wing supporters of Kurt Eisner and 
the Bavarian revolutions took the most active role in commemorating 
their legacy in the city. The first commemorative act occurred on the very 
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day of Eisner's assassination, 21 February 1919, in the form of a sponta- 
neous memorial erected in front of the murder site at the Palais Montgelas 
on the Promenadestrasse. Immediately after Eisner's death, unknown per? 
sons scattered sawdust over the remaining pool of blood and placed a 
chair behind it adorned with a picture of Eisner and a black ribbon of 
mourning. Other passersby, most notably soldiers, stacked assorted rifles 
in the form of a pyramid at the site, which still others decorated with 
flowers and wreaths. Capped with a sign that read "Proletarians, remove 
your hat before the blood of Eisner," the provisional monument was 
visited by thousands of Miinchner and attested to Eisner's new and un- 
likely status as a "Bavarian folk hero."24 Indeed, the attendance of over 
100,000 people in the funeral procession on 26 February 1919 provided 
further proof of his local standing. This monument, however, would only 
be a provisional one that lasted until the chaotic month of April 1919.25 
Following the burial of Eisner's ashes in Munich's Ostfriedhof, his left? 
wing supporters adopted more permanent commemorative measures. On 
the second anniversary of the Bavarian revolution on 7 November 1920, 
the local SPD leadership, together with labor union leaders, unveiled a 
bronze plaque bearing a relief of Eisner and the words, "To Kurt Eisner, 
the fallen fighter for freedom and truth, from his comrades," in the court 
of both groups' central headquarters on the Pestalozzistrasse.26 Two years 
later, on 1 May 1922, the same left-wing coalition commemorated a more 
somber occasion, the third anniversary of the crushing of the Bavarian 
Soviet Republic, by unveiling a large cubic monument dedicated to Eisner, 
as well as to the victims of the revolution of 1919, at the Ostfriedhof. 
The selection of this particular site was not incidental; as the Ostfriedhof 
was the cemetery nearest to Munich's solidly working-class and left-leaning 
neighborhood of Giesing, it provided the most politically appropriate location 
to acknowledge the sacrifices made by the population on behalf of 
the revolution. The monument clearly articulated the Left's memory of 
the revolutionary past. Containing an urn bearing Eisner's ashes, the 
"Revolutionsdenkmal" was graced with a bronze plaque commemorating 
Eisner, as well as two accompanying texts on its front and rear sides. 
While the front exhibited the words, "To the dead of the revolution of 
Bewegung" (Regensburg, 1991); Anthony Nicholls, "Hitler and the Bavarian Background to 
National Socialism," in: German Democracy and the Triumph of Hitler, ed. Anthony Nicholls 
and Erich Matthias (London, 1971), 99-128. 
24. Schmolze, Revoltion und Raterepublik, 240-42; Freya Eisner, "Zwischen Kapitalismus 
und Kommunismus," Die Zeit, 18 February 1994, p. 74; Allan Mitchell refers to this 
memorial as a "pagan altar," 275; Grunberger, Red Rising, 80; Herz and Halfbrodt, Revo? 
lution und Fotografie, 119?24. 
25. Herz, Revolution und Fotografie, 120. 
26. Ibid., 301. 
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1919," the rear displayed a quotation by Ernst Toller: "He who prepares 
the paths, dies on the threshold, but death bows before him in honor."27 
Finally, sometime later in the decade, the Bavarian state erected a third 
plaque in memory of Eisner at the site of his murder on the outer wall of 
the Palais Montgelas.28 All of these monuments clearly demonstrated the 
existence of local respect for the slain prime minister. 
The Right, however, represented the revolutionary era in a much different 
manner. Instead of commemorating Eisner, it concentrated on commemo? 
rating its own dead claimed by the revolution. In September 1919, a 
plaque to the eight Thule-Gesellschaft hostages killed by "red" troops at 
the Luitpoldgymnasium was erected on the exterior wall against which 
they were shot. Sponsored most probably by the right-wing Deutschvolkische 
Schutz-und Trutzbund and the Thule-Gesellschaft, the text read: "Ernst 
Berger, Anton Daumenlang, Walter Deike, Walter Neuhaus, Wilhelm 
Seydlitz, Freiherr Karl Teuchert, Prinz Gust. Thurn und Taxis, Grafin 
Hella Westarp died at the hands of the dastardly on April 30, 1919." Ten 
years later, an amended version of this plaque was erected including the 
names of the two Freikorps soldiers who, like the other eight hostages, 
were killed at the Luitpoldgymnasium.29 These right-wing monuments, 
together with their left-wing counterparts, indicate that the Weimar era 
was a divisive one that witnessed the competition of memories of the 
recent revolutionary past. 
The rise of the Nazis to power in 1933 led to the drastic reformulation 
of Munich's revolutionary past in collective memory. Given their ex? 
treme hatred of Eisner and the revolutions of 1918?1919, the Nazis quickly 
undertook efforts to purge the physical reminders of the past from the 
city.30 On 22 June 1933, Nazi city councilmen Hans Zoberlein and Christian 
Weber attacked the Ostfriedhof Revolutionsdenkmal as an "eyesore" for 
27. Thomas Guttmann, ed., Giesing: Vom Dorf zum Stadtteil (Munich, 1990), 176-79, 
259. See Herz and Halfbrodt, Revolution und Fotografle, 11, for a photograph of the monu? 
ment. The bronze plaque read: "Kurt Eisner, born 14 May 1867. Died 21 February 1919." 
Herz and Halfbrodt, Revolution und Fotografle, 301. 
28. Little evidence exists of the actual plaque. The Munich Stadtarchiv possesses no 
records of it; the few references to it appear after 1945 with the attempts of certain city 
councilmembers to restore it. Stadtarchiv Miinchen/Ratsitzungsprotokolle (StAMu/RP), 
Stadtrat, 14 January 1947, 190-91; 21 January 1947, 289-98. Letter to author from Dr. 
Helmuth Stahleder, Stadtarchiv Miinchen, 2 January 1996. 
29. Letter to author from Dr. Helmuth Stahleder, Stadtarchiv Miinchen, 2 January 1996. 
I am indebted to Dr. Stahleder for his assistance in tracking down the origins of this 
plaque. The date of this monument is the most likely one, but it may have been erected 
in 1933. For the slightly amended text see August Alckens, Miinchen in Erz und Stein: 
Gedenktafeln, Denkmaler, Gedenkbmnnen (Mainburg, 1973), 46. 
30. In Mein Kampf, Hitler refers to Eisner as having acted "solely as a servant of the 
Jews" who were trying to make the Reich "fall. . . prey to Bolshevism." Adolf Hitler, 
Mein Kampf (New York, 1971), 557. 
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"all good Germans" and called for its removal from the cemetery "as a 
self-evident matter of honor." Like the Nazis' destruction of Walter Gropius's 
expressionist monument to the victims of the Kapp Putsch in Weimar 
and Ludwig Mies van der Rohe's monument to Rosa Luxemburg and 
Karl Liebknecht in Berlin after 1933, the demolition of the Rev- 
olutionsdenkmal on 22 June 1933 constituted an act of deliberate political 
intimidation. Zoberlein was a representative of the working-class neigh- 
borhood of Giesing and undoubtedly intended the demolition of the 
monument as a clear message to its left-leaning inhabitants. The Nazis' 
destruction of plaques to Eisner on the Promenadestrasse and the 
Pestalozzistrasse also drove this point home.31 A second factor underpinning 
the destruction of the Revolutionsdenkmal was anti-Semitism. At the same 
time that Eisner's ashes were removed from the Ostfriedhof, the city council 
decided to remove the ashes of Gustav Landauer from the Waldfriedhof, 
or Forest Cemetery. Zoberlein justified this measure by arguing that, "the 
Christian citizenry does not want the ashes of their relatives to be in- 
terred with those of the Jews Eisner and Landauer." The expulsion of the 
two Jewish revolutionaries demonstrated, according to Zoberlein, that "we 
as Christians, Bavarians, and Germans do not want to be in a community 
with Jews."32 With these measures, Nazi hatred of the Jews and of the 
Left found clear expression. 
The Nazis' efforts to extinguish the memory of the revolutions of1918- 
1919 completely, however, were not wholly successful. The demolition of 
the Ostfriedhof monument paradoxically led not so much to the total 
elimination of memory but to its diminution through spatial transferral. 
Eisner's remains were ordered reinterred in the new Jewish cemetery in 
Schwabing together with those of Gustav Landauer, their graves marked 
with a new simple stone bearing their names.33 The memory of the 
revolutionary era, marginalized in the peripherally-located, textually-mute 
stone, was essentially banished from public view. Nevertheless, in this 
new monument "created" by the Nazis, it maintained a precarious if 
private existence. 
The Nazis, however, did not content themselves with eliminating the 
already existing monuments to the revolutions of 1918-1919 but erected 
their own revisionist versions of the past as well. The first move taken by 
the local Nazi leadership occurred in April 1933 with the renaming of 
31. Guttmann, Giesing, 176-79. As one Nazi councilman argued, "the memory of Kurt 
Eisner will remain preserved by the people . . . as a deterrent example for those who are 
inclined to harm the state." Herz and Halfbrodt, Revolution und Fotografie, 301. 
32. Herz and Halfbrodt, Revolution und Fotografie, 301. 
33. Karl W. Schubsky, "Jiidische Friedhofe," in Synagogen und judische Friedhofe in Miinchen, 
ed. Wolfram Selig (Munich, 1988), 186. 
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the Promenadeplatz into the Ritter-von-Epp-Platz (after the Freikorps 
leader, Franz Ritter von Epp who was instrumental in leading the suppression 
of the second Rdterepublik) ,34 The choice of this site was no doubt delib- 
erate; since it fronted the site of Eisner's assassination on the Promenadestrasse, 
the new name clearly asserted the Right's occupation and reconstitution 
of a historic site of the Left. Several years later, the local Nazi leadership 
appropriated the memory of the right-wing hostages executed by the red 
troops at the Luitpoldgymnasium in April 1919. In October 1936, a plaque 
to the two Freikorps soldiers killed was erected at the site that read: 
"Here, on April 30, 1919, the government soldiers Linnebriigger, Fritz, 
father of five children, 41 years old, and Hindorf, Walter, 19 years old, 
fell as defenseless prisoners at the hands of murderers."35 That same year, 
the Nazi-led city council attempted to create further sympathy for the 
"martyrs" of the revolution by naming four streets in the neighborhood 
of Kirchtrudering after Thule-Gesellschaft members, Hella von Westarp, 
Franz Carl Freiherr von Teuchert, and Walther Deike, as well as the 
Freikorps soldier, Fritz Linnebriigger.36 
The most dramatic expression of the Nazis' version of the Bavarian 
revolutions appeared in the form of the "Freikorpsdenkmal" in the neighbor? 
hood of Giesing. Designed by the sculptor Ferdinand Liebermann and 
erected at a busy traffic site, the Giesinger Berg, on 3 May 1942, the 
monumental stone structure was composed of a twenty-four foot high 
relief of a naked male figure strangling a snake symbolizing "degeneration 
and decline"; flanking the figure on an adjoining wall were the emblems 
and names of the 22 Freikorps companies that participated in the sup? 
pression of the Rdterepublik in early May of 1919.37 Although the symbol- 
ism of the monument was fairly obvious?the heroic Right saving the 
Volk from the dire threat of the Left?its function was more significant. 
In the planning stages since 1937, the late date of the monument's com- 
pletion testifies to the symbolic importance the Nazis assigned to it. The 
fact that it was finished at all is remarkable since the Second World War 
had halted many other construction projects sponsored by the regime. 
Most likely, as with the demolition of the Revolutionsdenkmal at the 
Ostfriedhof, the Nazis intended the Freikorps monument to remind the 
working-class inhabitants of Giesing of the Right's dominance over the Left 
not only in the past but in the present as well. 
34. Kurt Preis, Miinchen unterm Hakenkreuz, 1933-1945 (Munich, 1989), 30-31. 
35. Alckens, Miinchen in Erz und Stein, 46. 
36. See Hans Dollinger, Die Miinchner Strassennamen: Zu Fuss durch die Geschichte unserer 
Stadt (Munich, 1995), 121, 56, 179, 293. 
37. Elisabeth Angermair and Ulrike Haerendel, eds., Inszenierter Alltag: "Volksgemeinschaft" 
im nationalsozialistischen Miinchen, 1933-1945 (Munich, 1993), 32; Guttmann, Giesing, 176- 
79; Alckens, Miinchen in Erz und Stein, 41. 
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After 1945, the experience of the Third Reich strongly affected the post? 
war memory of Kurt Eisner and the revolutions of 1918-1919. Although 
the revolutionary era had been traumatic in its own right, the far more 
dramatic events that followed it?in particular, the establishment of the 
Third Reich, the outbreak of the Second World War, and the extensive 
war damage suffered by the city of Munich?inevitably east it in their 
shadow. As a result, the memory of the revolutionary era was increas- 
ingly refracted through the local memory of the Third Reich and the 
evolution of the memory of the events of 1918-1919 was both halted 
and propelled by attendant shifts in the memory of the Nazi era. As the 
latter was confronted more openly over time, so was the former. The 
memory of Kurt Eisner and the revolutionary era in Munich has thus 
been marked by an increasing willingness to abandon more prejudiced 
and subjective views of the past for a more balanced and nuanced per? 
spective. This development found clear expression in the increasingly explicit 
pattern of commemorating Kurt Eisner and the revolutions of 1918-1919 
in Munich. Beginning with the negative measure of demolishing unwanted 
Nazi monuments in the late 1940s, the commemoration process shifted 
in the 1950s to more tentative positive acts, such as restoring destroy ed 
monuments, and finally to the more direct attempts after the late 1960s 
to erect new monuments of increasingly forthright form, text, and loca? 
tion. And yet, despite this progressive process of normalization, the memory 
of the Bavarian revolutions of 1918-1919 has to this day remained highly 
politicized. 
The first years after 1945 displayed the most reluctance to confront the 
memory of Munich's revolutionary past. During this period, it was far 
easier to overturn the Nazis' highly partisan view of the revolutions of 
1918-1919 than to forge a consensus for remembering it. The initial and 
easiest measures were thus part of the general program of urban denazifi- 
cation decreed by the Allied occupation forces and undertaken by city 
agencies.38 The first relevant move was to grant the Promenadeplatz in 
the Altstadt its original name by eliminating its Nazi-era appellation, the 
Ritter-von-Epp-Platz.39 Interestingly, this was not repeated with the four 
Nazi-era streetnames to the victims of the "red" troops in 1919 which 
remained unaltered. This pragmatic strategy of selective decommemoration, 
moreover, also surfaced briefly with the postwar treatment of the 
38. Under the terms of Allied Control Council Directive no. 30, "any monument. . . 
which tends to preserve . . . the German military tradition ... or to commemorate the 
Nazi party . . . must be completely destroyed . . ." "Directive no. 30," Official Gazette of the 
Control Council for Germany, no. 7 (31 May 1946): 154. 
39. See "Umbenennung von Strassen und Platzen," Miinchner Stadtanzeiger, 26 Septem? 
ber 1945, p. 3 and 3 October 1945, p. 3; Helmuth Stahleder, Haus-und Strassennamen der 
Miinchner Altstadt (Munich, 1992), 24-25. 
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Freikorpsdenkmal in Giesing. Although the emblems and Freikorps names 
were removed as symbols of militarism prior to 1 January 1947 in ac- 
cordance with Allied denazification regulations, the monumental relief of 
the martial male figure itself remained standing. To be sure, little senti- 
mental feeling existed within the local population toward the figure, which 
already during the Third Reich had been derisively referred to as "der 
nackerte Lackel" or "the naked oaf" (Figure 1). For a time, however, city 
officials seemed to consider preserving the figure for "artistic reasons." 
Nevertheless, in December 1946, the surfacing of complaints by local 
citizens and the energetic lobbying of the Communist city council faction 
(KPD) to demolish the entire structure ultimately proved decisive. Shortly 
thereafter, the remaining figure was torn down and the accompanying 
wall reduced in height to the level of the surrounding retaining walls.40 
Although overturning the Nazi view of the past through such demoli? 
tion projects was relatively easy, restoring the mnemonic status quo ante? 
the Left's view of the past from the Weimar period?was more difficult. 
On 14 January 1947, the KPD city council faction demanded the resto? 
ration of the plaque to Eisner (removed by the Nazis after 1933) at the 
site of his murder on the Palais Montgelas. After a heated discussion, the 
city council referred the demand to the Bavarian state for consideration, 
at which point it was dropped altogether. While issues of bureaucratic 
jurisdiction were involved in this decision, one of its most important 
causes was the belief of numerous conservative members of the city council 
that "it was not advisable to preserve the memory of the Eisner era." 
Significantly, the desire of conservatives to avoid the memory of the past 
was itself founded on faulty memories of it. Mayor Karl Scharnagl, a 
member of the Christlich-Soziale Union (CSU), for one, argued that since 
"Eisner was not the democrat that everyone thought he was," it was 
unadvisable to "immortalize this truly regrettable affair for all eternity." 
Underlying this view was the assertion that "the acts of violence that 
occurred [during the Eisner era] . . . were of such proportions . . . that we 
do not believe they are worth remembering."41 Scharnagl's identification 
of Eisner's regime with the revolutionary violence that followed after his 
assassination represented one of the most common distortions of the historical 
record in postwar memory. This conflation of historical events, moreover, 
40. City building director Hermann Leitenstorfer gave his approval for the demolition 
after concluding that "artistic reasons for preserving [the figure] have receded in impor? 
tance." StAMii/RP, Hauptausschuss, 13 February 1947, 174-76; "Gegen das Freikorps- 
Denkmal," Miinchner Mittag, 20 December 1946, p. 5. In its place, a bronze sculpture by 
Josef Erber representing children at play, flanked by reliefs of scenes from local history, 
was erected in the fall of 1959. "Ein Kinderbaum . . .," SZ, 27 October 1959, p. 4; Alckens, 
Miinchen in Erz und Stein, 73. 
41. StAMii/RP, Stadtrat, 21 January 1947, 291. 
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Figure 1: "Freikorpsdenkmal" in Giesing 
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would surface repeatedly as the basis for resisting subsequent attempts to 
commemorate Eisner or the revolutionary era. In short, as indicated by 
the city council's reluctance to pursue energetically the restoration of the 
plaque to Eisner in 1947, negative memories of the slain prime minister 
contributed to the failure to restore his place in local memory.42 
The 1947 city council debate further revealed that the political Left in 
Munich held a very different memory of Eisner and the Bavarian revolu? 
tionary era. During the debate, SPD and KPD city council members pre- 
dictably defended Eisner's democratic credentials, asserted his innocence 
for the violence that occurred after his murder, and demanded the resto? 
ration of the plaque as an act of "reparations" for the deeds of the Nazis. 
In so doing, they adhered more closely than conservatives to the histori? 
cal record. Not only did they carefully distinguish between the frequently 
blurred facts of the period, they perceptively noted how "the consider? 
able distance from the former era . . . had produced alterations in per? 
spective" among the opposition. The Left, however, was no less partisan 
in its exploitation of the past for their own ends. In defending Eisner's 
reputation, the left-wing city council factions mobilized the recent his? 
tory of the Third Reich on their behalf. SPD city councilman and union 
leader Gustav Schiefer, for example, attempted to bolster Eisner's democratic 
credentials by comparing him to the brave men of the famed Freiheitsaktion 
Bayern, or Freedom Action Bavaria (a group which had attempted unsuc- 
cessfully to topple the local Nazi regime in late April 1945); for Schiefer, 
Eisner had simply acted as a representative of "a healthy opposition that 
was committed to establishing new conditions."43 Although more rhetori? 
cal than substantive, the linkage of the revolutions of 1918-1919 with 
the resistance to the Third Reich aimed to give moral legitimacy to persons 
and events of the revolutionary past by asserting similarities between them 
and the few heroic resistance figures of the more recent Nazi past. More 
problematic than the SPD's drawing of analogies between the revolution? 
ary era and the Third Reich, however, was its partial hypocrisy in de? 
fending Eisner. Indeed, after 1918, the SPD leadership had vigorously 
opposed Eisner, the head of the rival USPD, during his short administra? 
tion and had eagerly hoped to govern in his place. The party's postwar 
loyalty to Eisner's legacy thus betrayed a selective memory as well, but in 
the early postwar era, this left-wing memory of the past was too weak to 
overcome conservative resistance to the recommemoration of Eisner and 
his revolutionary legacy. 
Following the general reluctance to confront the past in the 1940s, the 
42. The fact that the bill was sponsored by the KPD?a party soon to be banned na- 
tionwide as a result of cold war tensions?no doubt also hampered its passage. 
43. StAMu/RP, Stadtrat, 21 January 1947, 294. 
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late 1950s witnessed the first limited moves to commemorate Eisner and 
the events of 1918-1919. In 1958, the Munich city council ordered the 
partial reconstruction of the demolished Ostfriedhof Revolutionsdenkmal. 
The motivations behind this action are unclear; the fact, however, that 
the measure was tacked onto an extant bill to erect a monument in the 
Ostfriedhof to the political victims of the Nazi regime indicates that it 
may have originated as an afterthought, though a comparatively progres? 
sive one. That the effort to commemorate the victims of the Third Reich 
prompted the commemoration of the victims of 1918-1919 further dem? 
onstrates the postwar linkage between the two periods in local memory. 
The close proximity of the early postwar era to the events of the Third 
Reich no doubt led many to derive meaning from the earlier revolution? 
ary era only insofar as it evoked similarities with the Nazi era that fol- 
lowed. This linkage, in turn, may have determined the inexact manner in 
which the Revolutionsdenkmal was restored. Since neither remnants nor 
design drafts of the original were to be found, the monument's form had 
to be reconstructed according to the memory of the local sculptor, Konstantin 
Frick. More significantly, the city council decreed that the original texts 
were not to be reproduced in full; the only words that graced the recon? 
structed monument, therefore, were: "To the dead of the revolution of 
1919." The reference to Eisner was omitted as was Ernst Toller's quota- 
tion. With such vague wording, the effect of the monument in preserving 
the memory of the events of 1918-1919 was minimal; since the identity 
of "the dead" was left undetermined, one could have just as easily inter- 
preted them to be Freikorps soldiers as left-wing sympathizers of the revo? 
lution for whom the monument was originally intended. It is difficult to 
know whether such ambiguity was intended. The Revolutionsdenkmal's 
resemblance to many textually vague monuments erected in the Federal 
Republic to the victims of Nazism in the 1950s, however, seems to indi- 
cate an underlying desire to avoid a direct confrontation with the past. 
As with these postwar monuments, the refusal of the Revolutionsdenkmal 
to identify "the dead" reflected the era's tendency to unite victim and 
perpetrator together in a gesture of forced reconciliation.44 As such, the 
impact of the Third Reich upon postwar habits of commemoration seems 
to have influenced the memory of the revolutions of 1918-1919. 
In the 1960s, however, a dramatic shift occurred in the commemora? 
tion of Eisner and the Bavarian revolutionary past. In the preceding dec? 
ade, local city officials had attempted little more than the adaptive restoration 
44. StAMii/RP, StR, Aktensammlung, 22 April 1958, 1326. In light of this bill, asser- 
tions that the monument was restored in 1945 appear to be in error. See Guttmann, 
Giesing, 176-79, 259 and "Die Inschrift und das Vermachtnis aufpoliert," SZ, 23 May 
1989, p. 15. 
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of older Weimar monuments to Eisner. The 1960s, however, witnessed 
the postwar era's first attempts to fashion its own strategies of commemo? 
rating the past. The marking of the 50th anniversary of the events of 
1918-1919 in 1969 stimulated new commemorative measures. The most 
ambitious, but least successful, occurred on February 21, the anniversary 
of Eisner's assassination, with the erection of a plaque on the site of his 
murder at the Palais Montgelas bearing the text: "Kurt Eisner was murdered 
on this spot fifty years ago." Since the plaque's sponsors, a left-leaning 
citizens' group (led by union leader and councilman Ludwig Koch as 
well as Eisner's granddaughter, Freya Eisner) did not get permission for a 
permanent monument at the site, the provisional plaque was removed 
shortly after its erection.45 The most controversial measure of 1969, how? 
ever, erupted one month earlier in January with the debate over naming 
a street after Kurt Eisner in the outlying neighborhood of Neuperlach. 
Originating as an SPD bill in the city council to mark the occasion of the 
50th anniversary of Eisner's death, the proposal to create a Kurt-Eisner-Strasse 
was linked to the suggestion to name one after Karl Marx. Significantly, 
it was not the latter proposal but the former that became the focus of 
controversy. 
As demonstrated by the conservative CSU's objection to the bill, the 
memory of Eisner and the revolutionary era remained burdened by nu? 
merous conflations and omissions. Overall, the representatives of the CSU 
argued that the memory of the revolutions of 1918-1919 deserved to remain 
suppressed. This position, not surprisingly, was based upon the familiar, if 
faulty, view of the past that blamed Eisner for the violent end of the 
revolutionary era. As CSU councilwoman Haas argued, Eisner had been 
a "communist" who was guilty of "creatfing] . . . a Soviet Republic ac? 
cording to the Russian model."46 This erroneous statement summed up 
the general conservative belief that "what Eisner and his following wanted 
led, in the end, to the Reich government's. . . [intervention] and the 
result of 700 dead."47 Operating according to this view, CSU council 
members predictably tried to justify their opposition to the proposal by 
making the populist claim that the name of Eisner "was associated in the 
minds of the local citizenry with great disaster." According to CSU 
councilman Hans Stutzle, this was a period that "had not yet been worked 
through" and had left "wounds that have not yet healed." "Naming a 
45. Photo with caption, SZ, 22/23 February 1969, p. 15. As indicated by a local citi- 
zen's demand (in a letter to the editor in the Suddeutsche Zeitung at this same time) to 
restore of the original plaque at the site (demolished by the Nazis), the Weimar-era monu? 
ment had clearly persisted in local memory. "Eisners Andenken ehren," SZ, 21 February 
1969, p. 12. 
46. StAMti/RP, Hauptausschuss, 14 January 1969, 6-21. 
47. StAMii/RP, Stadtrat, 15 January 1969, 66-95. 
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street after Eisner," he asserted, "would rip them open anew." As a con- 
crete, if bizarre, example of the problems entailed with confronting the 
past, Stiitzle cited the case of the widow of Eisner's assassin, Graf Arco- 
Valley, who as one of "the still living victims of that era," should be 
shown "consideration and respect" by waiting to enact such a measure 
"until one has greater distance in time from the former events." Con? 
servative councilman Ludwig Schmid, in turn, drew the full policy impli? 
cations of this assertion by concluding that, in light of the proposal's 
controversial nature, it would be better to abandon the practice of nam- 
ing streets after individuals altogether and, instead, name them after "won- 
derful flowers, charming animals, or beautiful lakes."48 Politically motivated 
objections thus found expression in a depoliticizing impulse. 
The responses of the SPD city council faction, in turn, displayed a 
more nuanced, if no less engaged, view of the past. Marshaling historical 
facts on their behalf, SPD councilmembers asserted Eisner's innocence of 
the violent suppression of the revolutionary era and cited numerous de- 
tails in support of their position that "the things that occurred after Eisner's 
death were an effect of his murder."49 More interesting than the SPD 
faction's citation of historical fact, however, was its members' insights 
into the dynamics of memory. According to SPD representatives, the 
calumnies expressed toward Eisner were a product of a long period of 
revisionist "historical falsification." As councilman Ludwig Koch argued, 
although "the fact remains that during Eisner's regime, no acts of vio? 
lence occurred,. . . . [n]either those who came after Eisner nor the dicta- 
tors of the Third Reich attempted to display an objective depiction of 
Eisner's historical image." The result of the ensuing "falsification," councilman 
Fried added, was that "one is inclined today to adhere to this false view 
of history." Interestingly, SPD leaders partially agreed with members of 
the CSU that the dispute over Kurt Eisner had resulted from the con- 
tinuing proximity to the historic events themselves. As Hans Preissinger 
noted, the persistence of "emotions and memories, of a personal and sub? 
jective nature" had strong political implications for historical understanding: 
The closer contemporary history approaches politics, the more it is 
falsified by the passions of politics. We have enough distance from 
Marx who, active a hundred years ago, . . . is viewed objectively, so- 
berly and without emotion as a historic innovator of his time. In con? 
trast, Eisner [is] still touched by contemporary history and falsified by 
political passions [and thus] lacks a well-rounded, fully-developed his? 
torical image. 
48. StAMu/RP, Hauptausschuss, 14 January 1969, 6-21. 
49. Ibid. 
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For Preissinger, however, it was the CSU that was especially guilty of 
promoting a faulty, "restorationist" view of the past for political gain. 
Although the CSU's representatives claimed the existence of widespread 
opposition to the measure among the local citizenry, it betrayed its par? 
tisan agenda, according to Preissinger, by defending the feelings of Arco- 
Valley's widow?an act that implicitly "sanctioned the murder of Eisner."50 
The SPD, in turn, refused to allow the CSU to claim a popular mandate 
for its opposition to the bill. "You cannot speak of 'the population,'" 
councilman Ludwig Koch accused the CSU, "because the segment of the 
population that strongly concerns me sees the history completely differ- 
ently." His constituency, Koch stressed, still "rememberfed] the white 
troops and their murders," and thus understandably yearned "for a cor- 
rection of the falsification of history."51 In short, by the late 1960s, the 
collective memory of the revolutions of 1918-1919 still remained frag- 
mented into opposing politicized versions. 
The narrow approval of the SPD proposal to create a Kurt-Eisner- 
Strasse in February 1969, in turn, sparked a brief, if intense, flurry of 
controversy within the local population of Munich. As demonstrated by 
letters to the editor received by the Miinchner Merkur, which closely cov- 
ered the issue, much of the local citizenry disapproved of the measure. 
According to the newspaper, some ninety percent of the more than 100 
letters received within a week of the decision opposed naming a street 
after Eisner.52 Many of the comments confirmed the SPD's view of the 
existence of false stereotypes about Eisner and his legacy. Some referred 
to Eisner as a "Communist" and a "political muddle-head," who had 
paved the way for the Soviet Republic; as one citizen noted, "To dedi- 
cate a street after a man whose deeds for Bavaria were of such a cata- 
strophic nature amounts to completing the anti-Bavarian nonsense of Eisner 
fifty years after the fact!" Another respondent articulated just how cata- 
strophic Eisner had been for Bavaria by implying that his reckless over- 
throw of the monarchy had eliminated the city's resistance to political 
extremism and eased "the victory of National Socialism." Although it is 
unclear how widespread this view was among conservatives, other at- 
tempts to link Eisner to the rise of the Nazis were made by respondents 
who compared the city council's decision to name a street after him to 
the hypothetical creation of "an Adolf-Hitler or Heinrich-Himmler Street." 
Furthermore, scattered right-leaning comments peppered the responses, 
such as the demand by one citizen finally to honor the "Free Corps fighters 
50. Ibid. 
51. StAMii/RP, Stadtrat, 15 January 1969, 66-95. 
52. "Leser schreiben uns," MM, 23 January 1969, p. 16. 
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who gave their blood so that Munich could remain a free city."33 Finally, 
the submission of a bill in the Bavarian Landtag by the far right-wing 
NPD party in early February objecting to naming a street "after the com? 
munist putschist, Kurt Kosmanowsky, called Kurt Eisner," betrayed the 
influence of classic anti-Semitic myths of Nazi propaganda and revealed 
the latent political direction of a portion of local opposition to the measure.54 
The conflict over the Kurt-Eisner-Strasse in 1969, in short, demonstrated 
the existence of politically-determined differences in collective memory. 
Representatives of the CSU as well as members of its constituency exhibited 
selective and distorted views of the revolutions of 1918-1919 and chose 
to project the causes of the subsequent violent conclusion of the period 
back onto its relatively peaceful beginnings under Eisner. Choosing not 
to acknowledge or condemn Eisner's murder as the cause of later events, 
conservative citizens and politicians viewed him as a perpetrator. The 
SPD view, in contrast, offered a far more objective picture of the past, 
emphasizing the distinctions between Eisner's goals, his government, and 
the revolutionary events which followed his death. Yet, the SPD view 
was also underpinned by a convenient forgetting of their own position in 
1918-1919. In view of the enmity and irreconcilable differences between 
the SPD and Eisner's USPD in 1918-1919, the former's postwar claims 
to protect his memory were, to say the least, ironic if not disingenuous. 
Still, while the SPD position was somewhat selective in nature, it served 
as a healthy corrective to the more problematic prejudicial alternative. 
And yet, despite the creation of Kurt-Eisner-Strasse, the city of Mu? 
nich still lacked a central monument to Eisner's memory fifty years after 
his death. The out-of-the-way location of the street in the outlying 
neighborhood of Neuperlach hardly served to preserve Eisner's memory 
in a public manner. For this reason, further commemorative impulses 
appeared in the 1970s. In mid-1973, the SPD-led city neighborhood com? 
mittee for the Altstadt submitted a bill in the city council for the erection 
of a plaque for Eisner at the site of his murder. Planned for the eastern 
wall of the Palais Montgelas on the Kardinal-Faulhaber-Strasse (the old 
Promenadestrasse), the plaque was to read: "Palais Montgelas. The Bavar? 
ian Prime Minister, Kurt Eisner, was murdered in front of this building on 
February 21, 1919 (emphasis added)." Had it been approved, this plaque 
would have promoted a new degree of public awareness about the past. 
53. "Starkes Echo zum Thema Strassennamen," MM, 18/19 January 1969, p. 10; "Leser 
schreiben uns,"MM, 23 January 1969, p. 16. 
54. Bayerischer Landtag, 6. Legislaturperiode, 1966-1970, supplement 1794, Schriftliche 
Anfrage, NPD, 3 February 1969. Reminiscent of other anti-Semitic canards proclaiming 
the Jewish "identity" of leftist politicians, the charge that Eisner's name was Kosmanowsky 
lacks all factual basis. Freya Eisner, "Zwischen Kapitalismus und Kommunismus," Die Zeit, 
18 February 1994, p. 74. 
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Yet, a serious blow to this commemorative gesture occurred when the 
owner of the property rejected its erection on the site due to fears of 
vandalism.55 As a result, when finally dedicated in late 1976, the plaque 
was relocated across the street, obscurely placed in the ground of the 
central, grassy strip of the Promenadeplatz frequently passed by trolley 
cars. More importantly, this shift required the following subtle but important 
amendment to the text: "In memory of Bavarian Prime Minister Kurt 
Eisner who was murdered on February 21, 1919 in front of the Palais 
Montgelas." Needless to say, the less visible site of the plaque separated it 
from the spot of the historic event (as did the replacement of the original 
words, "this building"?which would have clearly located the historic 
site in spatial terms?with "the Palais Montgelas," the location of which 
was far less clear); both features of the plaque, in turn, undermined its 
ability to preserve the past in memory. The only thing clearly expressed 
by the plaque was the continuing local ambivalence toward Eisner's legacy. 
As one left-wing labor union representative concluded, the undignified 
location of the monument "on the ground . . . directly next to the trol? 
ley tracks . . . is an indication of how progressive traditions are dealt with 
in Bavaria."56 
The final controversies over Kurt Eisner and the Bavarian revolutions 
of 1918-1919 occurred in the 1980s. By 1985, the increasing belief that 
the recently erected plaque for Eisner was "unworthy" led to new at- 
tempts to create a more explicit monument at the actual site of his mur? 
der.57 Initially, however, the proposal for "a worthy monument in the 
form of a column" made by SPD city councilman Alfred Lottmann met 
with widespread rejection from conservative citizens groups and an out- 
right veto by the CSU city council faction.58 Underlying the opposition 
were traditional resentments against Eisner. As the Bavarian Landtag rep? 
resentative and opponent of the measure, Richard Hundhammer, ar? 
gued, Eisner did not deserve a monument since he had "propagated violence" 
and seized power "with a bunch of left-wing radicals, Communists, and 
anarchists."59 Although this conflation of events was familiar, the public 
response to the measure's defeat expressed an unprecedented degree of anger. 
In a stream of critical letters to the editor in the Suddeutsche Zeitung in 
55. "Wo Kurt Eisner ermordert wurde . . .," SZ, 9 November 1976, p. 19. This fear 
was not unfounded given the destructive attacks against a plaque dedicated to Lenin on the 
site of his former residence in Schwabing in 1970. Alckens, Giesing, 76. 
56. Reimund Mess, Das andere Miinchen: DGB-Stadtrundfahrt (Munich, 1983), 27. 
57. Letter from Hannes Konig, SZ, 6 September 1985, p. 20. 
58. RMDSS/RP, Lottmann Antrag, no. 819, 20 August 1985; Bauausschuss, 24 Octo? 
ber 1985, 382-85; Bauausschuss, 27 February 1986, Aktensammlung, 497-502. "Streit um 
Kurt Eisner," SZ, 27 August 1985, p. 9. 
59. "Streit um Kurt Eisner," SZ, 27 August 1985, p. 9. 
244 MONUMENTS AND THE POLITICS OF MEMORY 
the summer of 1985, local citizens roundly denounced the false remem- 
bering of the past. Some adopted the traditional approach of staunchly 
defending Eisner's pacifism; others, however, adopted a provocative new 
strategy, charging that behind "the outcry against. . . erecting a monu? 
ment to Eisner lay the ugly face of anti-Semitism."60 In large part, this 
new accusation surfaced in response to the report that representative 
Hundhammer had drawn upon an old Nazi strategy in referring to Eisner 
as "Kosmanowsky" in a letter to Munich mayor, Georg Kronawitter. This 
news, in turn, led other citizens to warn against "the acceptance of Nazi 
propaganda" and its timeworn claim that the revolution had been the 
work of "foreign elements of mostly Jewish blood." Indeed, in a subse- 
quent city council debate, councilman Alfred Lottmann clearly articulated 
the need to stand firm against "the usual anti-Semitic falsifiers of his? 
tory."61 The unprecedented attention to Eisner's Jewish identity as well as 
the widespread sensitivity toward anti-Semitism that suddenly surfaced in 
the 1980s was most likely influenced by the wave of commemorations 
and controversies surrounding the 40th anniversary of the end of World 
War II in 1985?a time when the Bitburg affair and the celebrated speech 
of 8 May 1985 of Bundesprasident Richard von Weizsacker represented 
two opposing poles of West German attempts of Vergangenheitsbewaltigung. 
In any case, the new coupling of anti-Semitism with any opposition to 
commemorating Eisner contributed to the withering of resistance to the measure. 
Finally, in October 1985, the city council, led by the SPD and the Greens, 
overcame conservative objections and ultimately approved the bill.62 
And yet, as preparations for the monument proceeded in the period 
that followed, the eruption of a new controversy demonstrated the con- 
tinuing divisiveness of Eisner's legacy.63 By the fall of 1988, the city council's 
building committee had approved a design for a monument at the site of 
60. Letter from Paul Walter, SZ, 13 September 1985, p. 16. 
61. See letters from Gerald Engasser, Paul Walter, Peter Hendl, SZ, 13 September 1985, 
p. 16 and Heinrich Bihrle and Klaus Budzinkski, SZ, 25 September 1985, p. 16; "Noch 
kein Platz fiir Eisner-Denkmal," SZ, 25 October 1985, p. 15. 
62. Opponents had claimed that insufficient space existed on the sidewalk site for a 
monument. RMDSS/RP, Bauausschuss, 24 October 1985, 382-85; Bauausschuss, 27 Feb? 
ruary 1986, Aktensammlung, 497-502; "Jetzt doch ein Denkmal fur Kurt Eisner," SZ, 31 
October/1 November 1985, p. 17. 
63. While the commissioning of a monument would take several years to yield results, 
unconventional interim measures served to maintain the new interest in Eisner. On 21 
February 1986, the anniversary of Eisner's death, members of the SPD-affiliated group, 
"The Other Bavaria," launched its action "the invisible monument," tearing up a flagstone 
in the Kardinal-Faulhaber-Strasse's sidewalk and burying a plastic painting of Eisner be- 
neath it, before restoring the site's appearance. While the commemorative impact of this 
action was limited, it attested to a new impulse to recognize Eisner's symbolic importance. 
"Unsichtbares Denkmal fiir Kurt Eisner," SZ, 23 February 1986, p. 19; "Vom Problem, 
mit einer Inschrift Zeichen zu setzen," SZ, 3 February 1989. 
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Eisner's murder. Created by the artist Erika Lankes, a cast-iron plate bearing 
the outlined likeness of a sprawled figure (similar to those drawn in chalk 
by police at a crime scene) was to be embedded in the pavement where 
Eisner had been shot. This proposal, by far the most visually compelling 
to be devised in the postwar period, however, soon became embroiled in 
controversy because of its accompanying text. Following discussions between 
representatives of the building committee and the Munich city archive, it 
was agreed to select the text: "Kurt Eisner, 1867-1919, prime minister of 
the Volksstaat of Bavaria, was shot here in front of his office headquarters 
on 21 February 1919."64 In response to this draft, SPD members of the 
city council issued a counter proposal protesting that, in fact, Eisner had 
been the founder and prime minister not of the Volksstaat but of the Freistaat 
of Bavaria and should be acknowledged as such in the text.65 This point 
of dissension, inconsequential on the surface, in fact gave significant insights 
into the conflicting memories of Eisner and the revolutionary past. 
The question of whether Eisner should be acknowledged as the founder 
of the Volksstaat or Freistaat of Bavaria touched upon nothing less than 
the very perception of postwar Bavarian identity. Ever since 1945, the 
state of Bavaria had adhered to the designation Freistaat, a term that, like 
Volksstaat, also denoted a republican form of government. For the SPD, 
of course, establishing Eisner as the founder of the Freistaat legitimated 
their own historic claims to having shaped the state's identity and en- 
hanced the party's political prestige. Yet, in a state solidly ruled since the 
end of World War II by the conservative CSU, any linkage of its current 
political identity to an unpopular independent socialist figure such as Eisner 
was bound to threaten the party's own claims to power and thus would 
be unwelcome.66 Determining the exact nature of Eisner's historical role 
in creating the Bavarian republic thus was an issue of strategic importance. 
Ultimately, the resolution of the monument's text was settled not by 
historical fact but by a politically-colored interpretation of history. As 
SPD member Alfred Lottmann insisted in an emotional city council de? 
bate in February 1989, the fact that Eisner proclaimed Bavaria to be a 
Freistaat already in his first addresss to the Landtag on 7 November 1918 
firrnly established him as the founder of the state's current designation. 
Eisner, he argued, viewed the term as denoting independence from mon? 
archy; the term Volksstaat for him merely denoted the fact that all "state 
authority emanated from the people" and simply signified "a democratic 
64. RMDSS/RP, Bauausschuss, 2 February 1989, Aktensammlung, 506. 
65. RMDSS/RP, Stadtrat, 22 February 1989, 113-44. 
66. In addition to having dominated the post of Minister President (except during the 
tenure of Wilhelm Hoegner), The CSU has possessed an absolute majority in the Landtag 
since 1962. Rainer A. Roth, Freistaat Bayern: Politische Landeskunde (Munich, 1994), 73. 
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system of government distinct from dictatorship." CSU representatives 
responded by citing a range of primary sources from the era to show 
that, while Eisner may well have first used the term Freistaat, his regime 
quickly adopted the term Volksstaat instead; the term Freistaat, they ar? 
gued, entered into standard usage only after May 1919 when the cabinet 
of Johannes Hoffmann adopted it to separate itself from the bygone revo? 
lutionary regimes.67 Yet, CSU councilman Zehetmaier's conclusion that 
"one can hardly assert any identity between the republic that Eisner pro- 
claimed and our Freistaat created after the war," elicited sharp responses 
from SPD representatives. As SPD councilman Klaus Junger argued, the 
distinguishing elements of Eisner's republic were all to be found in the 
current Bavarian system: the republican system of government (marking 
the liberation from the "rotten monarchy"), universal suffrage, democratic 
elections, and a federalistic orientation. The modern Freistaat of Bavaria, 
though certainly different from the Freistaat proclaimed by Eisner, had its 
origins within it. Ultimately, however, SPD mayor Georg Kronawitter's 
remark that the choice of Freistaat or Volksstaat would be a "political 
decision" was borne out by events. In the final city council vote, the CSU 
was victorious. When at last dedicated later in the year, the new text of 
the monument read: "Kurt Eisner, who proclaimed the Bavarian Republik 
on 9 November 1918, and the future prime minister of the Volksstaat of 
Bavaria was murdered on this spot on February 21, 1919." In denying 
Eisner any links to the term Freistaat, the conservative CSU maintained 
its protectionist claims upon it.68 
Although the politicized decision to deny Eisner's contribution to the 
modern Bavarian state indicated continuing discomfort with his legacy, 
the resulting monument nevertheless represented the dramatic evolution 
of his place in postwar memory. A historical legacy that had once been 
marginalized silently from the cityscape had now acquired a central place 
within it. An additional indication of the revision of memory in the 1980s 
was provided by a second alteration to the Revolutionsdenkmal in the 
Ostfriedhof in 1989. While the cubic stone monument, destroyed by the 
Nazis, had been restored in 1958, it had only regained one undescriptive 
text, "To the dead of the revolution of 1919." In 1989, however, local 
labor unions marked the 70th anniversary of the crushing of the Rdterepublik 
by once more engraving the stone with its original quotation by Ernst 
Toller, as well as two new phrases: "In memory of Kurt Eisner, 1867- 
1918" and, more notably, "To the Victims of the Resistance, 1933-1945." 
Once again, in linking the victims of the "white" troops and those of 
67. RMDSS/RP, Stadtrat, 22 February 1989, 113-44. 
68. Ibid. 
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their more politically extreme descendents, the Nazis, this last textual 
addition offered an implicit message about historical causality. For the 
Left, the revolutions of 1918-1919 remained important as a means of 
illuminating the larger lessons of the Third Reich. In commemorating 
the persecution of the Left by the Right in two different historical eras, 
the monument served, according to union leader Jakob Deffner, the in? 
tended function of urging resistance to "racism, fascism, and [support] for 
freedom and democracy."69 In effect, the alteration of the Revolutions? 
denkmal provided the Left with a site to express its own view of the past 
denied to it in front of the Palais Montgelas. The very need to acquire 
such commemorative parity, however, attested to the continuing inability 
to arrive at a mnemonic consensus.70 
Finally, as demonstrated by the range of fleeting controversies occa- 
sioned by the 75th anniversary of the Bavarian revolutions in 1993-94, 
the politicization of memory has continued. The CSU provided further 
indications of its continuing historical amnesia by the refusal of party 
leaders such as German Finance Minister Theo Waigel and Bavarian Minister 
President Edmund Stoiber in November 1993 to attend an SPD-sponsored 
ceremony in the Munich Residenz marking the 75th anniversary of Eisner's 
proclamation of the Bavarian republic. Claiming that he was "unable to 
associate the birthdate of democratic . . . Bavaria with the proclamation of 
the Soviet Republic by Kurt Eisner," Waigel excused himself by a care- 
less, yet politically shrewd, misuse of history typical of local postwar 
conservatives.71 And yet, in contrast to this display of "ignorance," signs 
of the expansion of local collective memory have continued to appear in 
Munich, as demonstrated by the provisional erection of an unsolicited 
commemorative plaque in honor of Gustav Landauer at Munich's Stadelheim 
prison in late April 1994. Although quickly removed by local authorities, 
the plaque's blunt text?"Gustav Landauer was murdered here on May 2, 
1919"?and the theatrical spilling of tomato juice in front of it by its 
creators demonstrated a new willingness to confront uncommemorated 
aspects of the city's revolutionary past.72 Importantly, this impulse re? 
ceived official state sanction in late January 1997, when Munich Mayor 
Christian Ude unveiled a permanent plaque to Gustav Landauer in Schwabing 
with the intent of "rescuing Landauer from oblivion" and acknowledging 
69. "Die Inschrift und das Vermachtnis aufpoliert," SZ, 23 May 1989, p. 15. 
70. The naming of "Erich-Muhsam-Platz" in Schwabing in 1989 also represents the 
creation of a site for the political Left. Dollinger, Die Miinchner Strassennamen, 72. 
71. Christian Schneider, "Historikerstreit auf bayerisch," SZ, 6/7 November 1993, p. 3. 
72. "Mit Verkehrsschild und Tomatensaft," SZ, 25 April 1994, p. 14; "Denken an einen 
Ermordeten," Abendzeitung, 25 April 1994, p. 12. The monument was erected by the local 
artists Wolfram Kastner and Eckhard Zylla. 
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his historic importance as an intellectual and politician.73 After more than 
75 years, the revolutions of 1918-1919 continued to spark dissension as 
well as further acts of commemoration. 
In conclusion, the wide range of commemorative acts undertaken on behalf 
of Kurt Eisner and the Bavarian revolutions of 1918-1919 in postwar 
Munich demonstrates both the dynamism and ambiguity of local collec? 
tive memory. On the one hand, a dynamic pattern of increasing openness 
toward the revolutionary past over time clearly emerges from a survey of 
the city's monuments. The first responses toward the events of 1918? 
1919 in post-1945 Munich were limited to eliminating the Nazi regime's 
view of the past through the demolition of its monuments. The next 
attempts to commemorate Eisner sought merely to restore older, Weimar- 
era monuments to him; this modest goal, however, was still too radical 
for the late 1940s and only was successful in the late 1950s. Gradually, 
however, more proactive measures were taken. To be sure, the act of 
creating a mere street name after Eisner in an outlying suburb in 1969 
was a fairly tentative one; given the popular opposition to it, however, 
this modest move may well have been all that could have been expected 
at the time. The fact that the next commemoration in 1973 took the 
form of a tangible plaque located in the city center rather than a mere 
street name in the suburbs represented yet another advance; however, its 
relegation to an obscure site made it fall short of realizing its commemo? 
rative potential. Finally, the last monument erected in Eisner's memory 
in 1989 surpassed all previous ones in its combination of figurative and 
textual form as well as its prominent location; yet, it too was marked by 
some degree of historical reticence. As indicated by this increasingly explicit 
trajectory of commemoration, the position of the revolutionary past in 
local memory has experienced an undeniable, if halting, expansion. Its 
increasingly prominent physical "place" in the city reflects its evolution 
in local collective memory. 
And yet, local memory in Munich has stubbornly resisted the imposi- 
tion of consensus. This absence has resulted largely from the tendency of 
both the Left and the Right to tailor their views of the past to serve their 
own very different political ends. In the process, both have viewed the 
past selectively; the Right has refused to de-demonize Eisner or acknowl- 
edge his historic accomplishments, while the Left has covered up its Weimar- 
73. "Eine Tafel erinnert jetzt an Gustav Landauer," SZ, 25/26 January 1997, p. 45. 
The plaque's text reads: "Gustav Landauer, 1870?1919, philosopher, translator, and briefly, 
People's Representative for Popular Enlightenment, was murdered at the end of the Mu? 
nich Soviet Republic on May 2, 1919 in Munich-Stadelheim, as a radical socialist and 
violent anarchist." 
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era hostility to him with an opportunistic and hagiographic postwar posi? 
tion. The primary distortions of the past's facticity, however, seem to 
have been caused more by the Right than the Left. That Kurt Eisner 
today is still denied credit for founding the Bavarian Freistaat and is still 
viewed by some as responsible for the Rdterepublik attests not only to 
deficiencies in memory but to the continuing instrumentalization of it for 
political gain. This persistence of distortion certainly indicates the limited 
educational power of monuments; although the many monuments erected 
in postwar Munich have helped erode historic prejudices, they have not 
succeeded in eradicating them entirely.74 And to some degree, this is a 
matter of concern. For the absence of a balanced view of the past, after 
all, obstructs a full understanding of the present. 
Nevertheless, certain virtues may be found in the continuing absence 
of mnemonic consensus. In part, it is precisely because Munich's revolu? 
tionary past constantly has provoked politicized disagreement and resisted 
consensus that it has continued to occupy any place at all, let alone an 
important one, in local collective memory.75 As demonstrated by the per- 
petual battle between the Left and the Right over the past's legacy, it 
seems clear that the past is not so much remembered for its own sake as 
for utilitarian purposes?especially political gain. Conversely, the less the 
past is mobilized to serve a particular political end, the sooner it seems to 
be condemned to fade from neglect. In light of Michael Kammen's re- 
mark that "memory is. . . activated by contestation . . . [while] amnesia 
is. . . induced by the desire for reconciliation," it appears that preserving 
memory is guaranteed less by fostering agreement about the definitive 
"truth" about the past, than by the continual clash of competing views of 
it.76 Only by tolerating and contesting the distortion of the past, para- 
doxically, can the active memory of it be promoted. 
Finally, the continuing struggles with the legacy of the revolutions of 
1918-1919 in postwar Munich reveal that local collective memory has 
remained preoccupied with weighty issues beyond the insurmountable legacy 
of the Third Reich. Although "coming to terms with" the past has, since 
1945, referred to the Nazi era, it appears that there are, indeed, multiple 
74. To a degree, this failure reflects a built-in deficiency of monuments which, as many 
observers have pointed out, do not preserve memory to the extent commonly assumed. 
Whether or not one fully accepts the somewhat cynical views of Robert Musil that "there 
is nothing in the world so invisible as [a] monument" or James Young, that "the more 
memory comes to rest in its exteriorized forms, the less it is experienced internally," one 
must avoid the naive assumption that monuments inevitably preserve memory. Robert 
Musil, Gesammelte Werke (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1978), 506; Young, The Texture of Memory, 5. 
75. James Young has addressed this issue in noting that "the surest engagement with 
memory lies in its perpetual irresolution." Young, The Texture of Memory, 21. 
76. Michael Kammen, Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation f Tradition in American 
Culture (New York, 1991), 13. 
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"pasts" that still need to be "worked through." And yet, the memory of 
Kurt Eisner and the Bavarian revolutions has not fully been able to es? 
cape the shadows of the historical events that followed thereafter. Indeed, 
the memory of the era of 1918-1919 has been substantially refracted through 
local views of the Nazi past. If only to a limited degree, conservatives 
have linked the two periods in seeing Eisner's revolutionary recklessness 
as partially responsible for the rise of the Nazis. Much more frequently, 
liberals and those on the political Left have also represented the two 
periods as connected; yet while they have likewise seen the rise of the 
Nazis as rooted in the revolutionary events of 1918-1919, they have ar? 
gued clearly that it was due to the Right's violent intolerance and even- 
tual crushing of the Left that propelled the Nazis to prominence. In both 
cases, it is clear that the place of Kurt Eisner and the Bavarian revolutions 
in local memory has not been an uncontested one. 
These two insights, finally, may shed light upon the likely direction in 
which the working through of the East German past?the second 
Vergangenheitsbewaltigung?will proceed. As shown by postwar Munich's 
relationship to its own left-wing revolutionary legacy, and in light of the 
fundamental importance of anticommunism for the postwar identity of 
the Federal Republic, it is probable that the integration of the left-wing, 
East German identity into that of reunified Germany will be a painfully 
incremental process. Of course, after having attempted to "master" the 
Nazi past for over fifty years, the Germans have developed a sophisticated 
understanding of the workings of memory; the discussions about the legacy 
of the former GDR, therefore, will not likely suffer the same delays get- 
ting started, as was the case with the Nazi past. The confrontation with 
the East German past is still in its infancy, however. As the recent con- 
troversial demolition of many East German monuments demonstrates, the 
unified Federal Republic of Germany has only arrived at the point where 
its leaders have been confident enough to east aside the historical views 
of the bygone communist regime.77 If the insights provided by the treat? 
ment of Kurt Eisner in postwar Munich are any indication, however, the 
erection of new monuments commemorating various aspects of the East 
German past (whether to older communist heroes honored in the GDR, 
such as Rosa Luxemburg or Ernst Thalmann, or fallen would-be reform? 
ers such as Rudolf Herrnstadt) will take longer to realize. These and 
77. For a wide range of essays concerning the toppling of GDR monuments in the early 
1990s, see the entire issue of kritische berichte 3 (entitled "Der Fall der Denkmaler) (1992). 
See also Martin Schonfeld, "Erhalten-Zerstoren-Verandern? Diskussionsprozesse um die 
politischen Denkmaler der DDR in Berlin," kritische berichte 1 (1991): 39-43 and Hubertus 
Adam, "Zwischen Anspruch und Wirkungslosigkeit: Bemerkungen zur Rezeption von 
Denkmalern der DDR," kritische berichte 1 (1991): 44-64. 
GAVRIEL ROSENFELD 251 
other such future commemorations promise to be divisive and politicized. 
Beyond the issue of politicization, the case of Kurt Eisner further suggests 
that the memory of the East German past also will be refracted through 
the memory of the Third Reich. As demonstrated by the resurgerice in 
scholarly interest in the concept of totalitarianism, the dictatorship of the 
proletariat probably will continue to be compared to the dictatorship of 
the Fuhrer.? The East German past will remain in the foreground for the 
foreseeable future; but in the background will lurk the Nazi past, as it has 
since 1945. For these reasons, the second Vergangenheitsbewaltigung is better 
understood as a double Vergangenheitsbewaltigung. Without any doubt, the 
past will continue to occupy the present concerns of Germans for a long 
time to come. 
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78. See, for example, Ian Kershaw, "Totalitarianism Revisited: Nazism and Stalinism in 
Comparative Perspective," Tel Aviver Jahrbuch fiir Deutsche Geschichte 23 (1994): 23-41. 
